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Pew, if any, readers can claim to have mapped out 
the behavior of Godel, Escher, Bach, simply because the 
themes of this raulti-dimensional work range from Lewis 
Carroll-like dialogues and Zen koans to typogenetics 
and Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. While the book 
does contain a wealth of information, the reader will 
notice immediately that Professor Hofstadter offers 
more conjectures and suggestions, more illustrations 
and metaphors, than he does either argued conclusions 
or sound analogies. But the author does not claim to 
have crafted a tightly argued piece of analytic 
philosophy. On the contrary, in order to fully enjoy 
this book, the reader ought to carefully heed the 
book's subtitle: A Metaphorical Fugue on Minds and 
Machines in the SpTrlt of Lewis Carroll. 
Nevertheless, the reader may feel somewhat confused 
or fatigued upon concluding Part 1 of Godel, Escher, 
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Bach. The focus of attention is the introduction of 
Godel's Theorem, which is presented as the culmination 
of a discussion concerning formal systems, 
interpretations and the development of the 
propositional and predicate calculus. Those who are 
unfamiliar with formal systems will. find the 
discussion in Part I both interesting and helpful, 
while others might insist that the entire discussion is 
just too drawn out. But Part If of GEB promises 
something of interest to all. The discussion of formal 
systems is continued, and some of the most interesting 
developments in metamathematics are surveyed. The 
topics of special interest include the Church-Turing 
Thesis, Church's Theorem, Heukin sentences, and, of 
course, Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. These results 
are then applied to topics and problems in the field of 
computer systems and Artificial. Intelligence. 
The basic theme of the book centers upon the most 
interesting aspects of Godel's Theorem, namely, the 
notions of self-re Terence and levels of explanation and 
description which whereupon result. The author attempts 
to show how these notions are exemplified by Bach's 
Musical Offering and the drawings of M. C. Escher. In 
addition, Hofstadter extends his discussion of Godel 's 
Theorem to an examination of computer systems and 
languages, and then to the domain of thought itself. 
Of special interest to both Hie philosopher and the 
theorist in Artificial Intelligence alike is 
Hofstadter's discussion of the relation of thought 
processes to neuropbysiologicaI theory. According to 
Hofstadter, the fundamental question for the 
philosophically inclined theorist in Artificial 
Intelligence is: how does one reconcile the "software" 
of the mind with the "hardware" of the brain? This 
problem of reconciling mind and brain involves, as 
Hofstadter sees it, two questions: (!) How do neuron 
firings give rise to symbol activation? (2) Can symbol 
activation be described in terms which neither 
presuppose, nor refer to, neurophysiological entities 
and processes? (Hofstadter, pp. 302-9). Än affirmative 
answer to (2) would mean that thought processes could, 
in principle, be realized in more than one kind of 
"hardware"; in, for example, a computer circuit 
(Hofstadter, p. ISO). Question (I) is, of course, an 
old question in a new guise, and it is cleverly 
paraphrased by Hofstadter as the problem of 
I think, therefore I have no access 
to the level where I sum. 
(Hofstadter, p. 677). 
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Mofstadteir's sensitivity to philosophical issues is 
best illustrated by his attempt to locate the problem 
presented by the paraphrase. First, he urges the 
reader to realize that, theoretically, human agents 
admit of descriptions on the micro-physical, the 
chemical, the biological, and the macro-behavioral 
level. The question here is whether or not these 
description levels converge, and, if so, at what point? 
(Ilofstadter, p. 205). Specifically, Hofstadter asks us 
to suppose that thinking is in some sense a "flexible, 
intentional representation of the world" (Hofstadter, 
pp. 337-339). But then, Hofstadter notes, to ask how 
thoughts fit with neurophysiological theory is 
tantamount to forcing the element of intensional 
representation upon a micro-theoretical framework of 
the brain's activity. Instead, the question ought to 
be posed as follows: are neurophysiological processes 
analogous to conceptual representings, and, if so, in 
what respects? What corresponds to concepts pertaining 
to thoughts on the personal level of explanation, given 
a micro-theory of the brain? The answer must involve 
"a description which relates neural activity to 
'signals' (intermediate-level phenomena)--and which 
relates signals, in turn, to 'symbols' and 
'subsystems', including the presumed-to-exist 'self-
symbol'" (Hofstadter, p. 709). 
But how does one proceed with this description? 
What model is best suited for reconciling the software 
of thought with the hardware of the brain? Given 
Hofstadter's explicit recognition of the worth of 
analogy and his close connection with the computer 
field, one might expect him to offer a functionalist 
model for the problem of mind-brain. There are indeed 
many hints in this direction (see Hofstadter, pp. 49, 
147). For one, in his discussion of what might be 
called the "other-brains" problem, Hofstadter suggests 
that an isomorphism or functional mapping could be 
established between brains which is based upon the 
similarity of their respective symbol repertoire and 
their symbol triggering mechanisms (Hofstadter, pp. 
369, 375). Such a recommendation would provide a 
suitable basis for the functionalist approach. 
However, Hofstadter's model for the mind-brain 
relationship is not that of the logical-structural 
states of a computing machine. Hofstadter is instead 
concerned with examining the implications of Godel's 
results upon the problem of mind-brain. His question 
is thus: do words and thoughts follow formal rules? 
(Ilofstadter, p. 46). His answer is based upon what 1 
will call the formal systems model, and his suggestion 
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is that brains can be likened to a formal system. The 
laws of neurophysiology are viewed as analogical 
extensions of the formation and transformation rules of 
a formal system (Hofstadter, p. 559; also 
"Typogenetics," Chapter XVI). Thought processes are 
thereby characterized as the "informal, overt, software 
level" which "floats" on a substrate (here, the brain). 
Thoughts are said to "depend" upon a "formal, hidden, 
hardware level" and are grounded, in this case, by 
neurophysiological entities and processes. Of course, 
the philosopher would like to see such metaphors 
unpacked. But the attempt to do so, Hofstadter argues, 
runs into the problem called the "Reductionist's 
Dilemma" (Hofstadter, p. 552). One horn of this 
dilemma has already been noted, namely, that if the 
characterization of thought is sought on the micro-
level of the brain's activity, then the intensionaj, 
representational aspect of thought will, be lost. 
Alternately, should one proceed from the other 
direction--from neuron firings to the description of, 
say problem solving—then one will lose the determinacy 
and the preciseness which is achieved at the micro-
level . 
While Hofstadter's "levels" account of micro- and 
macro-descriptions is an illuminating result of his 
formal systems model, it is not sufficient for the 
reconciliation of the software of thought and the 
hardware of the brain. Ultimately, the image of 
thoughts "floating" on the hardware of the brain 
remains at the metaphorical level. The reader is left 
with the impression that conceptual representation is 
somehow an emergent phenomenon, a function of some 
hitherto unknown, and yet to be discovered, description 
of a (non-conceptual) state of the brain. 
My suggestion is that the formal systems model is 
too restrictive for an adequate solution to the mind-
brain problem. This conjecture may seem surprising, 
especially given the author's enthusiasm for the method 
of analogy. Hofstadter writes: "One can think of the 
Bongard (Pattern Recognition) problem-world as a tiny 
place where S c i e n c e ' is" done—that is, where the 
purpose is to discern patterns in the world." "As 
patterns are sought, templates are made, unmade, and 
remade; slots are shifted from one level of generality 
to another; filtering and focusing are done, and so on" 
(Hofstadter, pp., 659-650). In light of these remarks, 
I suggest that a solution to the mind-brain 
reconciliation problem must involve in Hofstadter's 
words, the "remaking of a template." The formal 
systems model ought to be extended to at least include 
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au analogy between overt speech and thought as they 
apply to the personal level of explanation and 
description. For despite Hofstadter's extended 
discussion of symbols and information, his model 
ignores this important analogical dimension for 
thought. Indeed, if one of the basic questions which 
confronts the AI theorist is "what is thought?," why 
not begin with a paraphrase of the Sellarsian 
challenge—what are thoughts except something analogous 
to the way sentences are related to each other and to 
their contexts? A functional characterization of 
thoughts as analogues to overt speech would, in 
addition, leave open the question concerning the 
qualitative nature of thoughts. They could be 
neurophysiological entities, but there would be no 
reason, in principle, why thoughts could not be 
grounded by other forms of "hardware." 
Hofstadter suggests, basing his discussion upon the 
formal systems model, that intensional phenomena 
(thoughts, ideas, images) can be described in terms of 
a Strange Loop, a process of level interaction which is 
an analogical extension of the Loop phenomenon in 
computer science. A Strange Loop is like a Henkin 
sentence, a sentence which asserts its provability and 
thereby becomes provable. Furthermore, as Hofstadter 
wri tes: 
This act of translation from low-
level physical hardware to high-
level psychological software is 
analogous to the translation of 
number theoretical statements into 
metamathematical statements. (709) 
Likewise, Hofstadter's solution to the problem of 
self-awareness is based upon his formal systems model 
and, particularly, upon the seif-referentiality of a 
Godel sentence in the predicate calculus (Hofstadter, 
pp. 406, 570). While the philosopher may suggest that 
the key to understanding self-awareness is to be found 
in the location of the similarities and the differences 
between self-awareness and other kinds of awareness 
(for example, perceptual knowledge), Hofstadter 
concludes that "the isomorphism which mirrors 
Typographical Number Theory inside the abstract realm 
of numbers can be likened to the quasi-isomorphism that 
mirrors the real world inside our brains, by means of 
symbols" (Hofstadter, p., 502). 
These are but a few of Hofstadter's many analogies 
between formal systems and thought. And they are, 
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without a doubt, il] umi tinting find into IRK ting. 1 have 
questioned their comprehensive nature in relation to 
the mind-brain reconciliation problem. I have also 
emphasized the method of analogy as a valuable tool for 
philosophical, explication and theory construction. It; 
is quite unlikely that Hofstadter would share this 
enthusiasm for the analogical approach. In point of 
fact, Hofstadter is more concerned with capturing the 
phenomenon of analogical awareness and procedural 
knowledge with some suitable means of simulation 
(Hofstadter, pp. 361-363; 619). His very inquiry into 
analogical awareness (especially, the kind of awareness 
instantiated by his own mind) leads Hofstadter to the 
conclusion that Godel^ Escher, Bach is "one, big self-
referential loopT11 This is a very interesting result 
which, I believe, deserves much praise and further 
attention. But in what direction do we take our 
inquiry? Shall we look for ways out of the Loop, or 
should we instead investigate the reasons which got. us 
into it in the first place? 
